The use of diagnoses in mental health service eligibility and exclusion criteria by Kinderman, P & Allsopp, Kate
The use of diagnoses in mental health service eligibility and exclusion criteria 
 
Kate Allsopp & Peter Kinderman 
 
Institute of Psychology Health and Society, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK 
 
To cite this article: Kate Allsopp & Peter Kinderman (2019): The use of diagnoses in mental health 
service eligibility and exclusion criteria, Journal of Mental Health, 
DOI:10.1080/09638237.2019.1677875 
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09638237.2019.1677875 
Published online: 24 Oct 2019. 
 
Abstract 
Background: Diagnoses are controversial but ubiquitous in mental health; however, whether they are 
essential features of service entry has not been analysed. 
Aim: To investigate the use of diagnosis in the service entry criteria of UK NHS adult mental 
health services. 
Methods: Freedom of Information requests were made to 17 NHS adult mental health Trusts; 
responses were analysed thematically. 
Results: Four service types were identified: broadly diagnostic, problem-specific, supporting specific 
life circumstances and needs-led. Diagnoses were used frequently but not universally. Non-diagnostic 
factors were central to service entry criteria. 
Conclusions: Diagnoses were neither necessary nor sufficient in-service entry criteria. Broad clusters 
of difficulties were used rather than specific diagnoses. Extensive exceptions revealed diagnoses as 
inefficient proxies for risk, severity and need. Differences across criteria appeared largely driven by 
professional competencies. Implications for innovative care pathways include preventative services 
and working with psychosocial factors. 
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Psychiatric diagnosis arguably facilitates communication between individuals and professionals 
(Craddock & Mynors-Wallis, 2014), provides clarity around identification of difficulties, and 
treatment options for those difficulties (Callard, Bracken, David, & Sartorius, 2013). Even critics of 
psychiatric diagnosis recognise it as central to the planning and organisation of mental health services 
(Harper, 2013). Kendell and Jablensky (2003) discuss the poor validity of current diagnostic 
categories, but nevertheless, argue that many diagnoses remain invaluable due to their clinical utility. 
However, they emphasise that, “statements about utility must always be related to context, including 
who is using the diagnosis, in what circumstances, and for what purposes” (p. 11). This paper 
considers the utility of psychiatric diagnoses within the context of the gatekeeping role performed by 
service entry criteria. 
 
Methodology 
Freedom of Information (FOI) requests and responses 
Services’ entry and eligibility criteria are locally decided, and information is not held centrally within 
the NHS. Freedom of Information requests were therefore submitted to each of the 17 NHS mental 
health Trusts in the North of England. Each asked: “What are the service entry criteria for each of the 
adult mental health services (community & specialist) within the Trust? I.e. on what information is a 
decision based when accepting an individual to each service (e.g. the service entry criteria for 
CMHTs, early intervention, eating disorders services and so forth)”. 
Eleven Trusts responded with a breakdown of entry criteria for different services. Of these, seven 
gave detailed responses representing all services within the Trust, and four gave information for six or 
fewer services. The services described in these incomplete responses were analysed as part of the 
findings below. A further two Trusts signposted to websites where some or all of the information was 
publicly available. The majority of information from Trusts included descriptions of the purpose of 
services, as well as lists of their entry criteria. This information was included within data analysis. 
Two Trusts offered only a brief response giving an overview of the process of referrals to services and 
will, therefore, be excluded for the purposes of this paper. Two Trusts declined to respond on the 




Information about each service type was examined carefully to ensure appropriate comparison with 
other services, and services with different names were checked for similarities; for example, a 
“clinical treatment team” (Trust G) was identified as an electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) service, and 
categorised accordingly. Detailed data for each service were organised using nVivo software. 
Thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used to analyse the data, in order to identify and 
analyse patterns or themes in the data, and to give a map or outline of these themes across the dataset. 
This process produced a framework of four service types: (1) broadly diagnostic services; (2) 
problem-specific but non-diagnostic services; (3) services supporting specific life circumstances; and 
(4) needs-led services providing specialist or particular services. A further theme related to the 
frequent use of diagnoses in exclusion criteria. 
 
Ethical approval 
Information gained through FOI requests is available in the public domain, and does not contain any 
personal or identifying information (Savage & Hyde, 2014); therefore, ethical approval was not 




Broadly diagnostic services 
The majority of services within this theme performed a specialist role (Table 1). Diagnoses were 
rarely used in a form that would equate to specific ICD or DSM diagnostic criteria. Two service types 
were for the specific assessment and intervention of a particular diagnosis (ADHD, gender identity 
difficulties). For example, “To provide assessment and/or follow up for people with symptoms of 
ADHD graduating from CAMHS, those adults with a previous diagnosis of ADHD not in Service and 
those adults with a suspected diagnosis of ADHD” (Trust A). The majority of services, however, 
identified broad bands of diagnoses, such as learning difficulties (LDs), and “personality disorders”. 
These represented a broad range of experiences and diagnoses rather than a specific ICD or DSM 
diagnostic category.  
These findings suggest that the rationale for “broadly diagnostic” services was one of the 
competency-based teams working together because they had specialist skillsets necessary to work 
with particular difficulties, and perhaps a particular ethos, but not because diagnostic criteria were 




Some services identified several diagnoses; “Individuals suffering depression and/or anxiety and/or 
stress or an anxiety disorder, or living with a long term physical health condition that has a 
psychological impact” (Trust K), and others gave lists of a dozen different diagnoses with a statement 
that treatment was “primarily provided for the following psychological problems only” (e.g. Trust F 
and Trust J). However, these diagnoses were also associated with a particular level of need, at a 
specific severity of difficulties.  
Specialist services, such as “personality disorder” and “eating disorder” services were largely 
diagnostic, but criteria also explicitly required complex needs and significant risk associated with the 
diagnosis that necessitated such a specialist service, such as “moderate to severe Anorexia 
Nervosa…severe Bulimia Nervosa” (Trust M). These criteria indicated a particular level of severity, 
with an expectation that mild to moderate eating difficulties are seen in primary care, or other non-
specialist services. The provision of services for particular diagnoses, therefore, shows diagnostic 
labels being used as a proxy for a particular severity of difficulties. Some services required additional 
tools to corroborate this information by using formal rating scales to measure functioning (IAPT, 
Trust F; mental health access team, Trust J). 
 
Problem-specific services 
Problem-specific services provided interventions for collections of similar difficulties, to organise and 
access specialist care, but did not use formal diagnostic categories (Table 2).  
These included early intervention in psychosis (EIP) services (reported by eight Trusts), services for 
psychosexual problems (reported by two Trusts), traumatic stress, and alcohol and substance misuse 
problems. Although each of these could be associated with ICD or DSM diagnosis (for instance, 
substance misuse disorder diagnoses), the criteria for these services instead used descriptions of 
difficulties, for example, “[a]ll adults (individuals and couples) who are experiencing relationship 
difficulties or sexual dysfunction with likely psychosexual components” (Trust K). A traumatic stress 
service (Trust G) used a checklist tool to determine severity as it is, “a specialist service and is 
provided for patients who are assessed as experiencing severe or extreme symptoms. It is assumed 
that local teams will have the skills and capacity to provide assessment and treatment for patients who 
present with mild to moderate symptoms of trauma” (Trust G). For many EIP services, the emphasis 
was explicitly on symptoms not diagnosis; “Acceptance will be based on symptom presentation rather 
than diagnostic criteria” (Trust D); “acceptance is irrespective of potential diagnosis” (Trust N). Trust 
N defined psychosis as “distressing hallucinations or delusional beliefs of sufficient intensity and 
frequency”, a much looser definition than any psychosis-related diagnostic criteria. 
 
 
Two Trusts specifically highlighted working with “diagnostic uncertainty” (Trust F and Trust N), 
whereby the teams assess and work with people’s psychotic experiences even where a diagnosis 
appears unclear. These services offer an example of teams working together with specialist skills, but 
also indicative of how NHS trusts can design, commission and manage services without necessarily 
relying on diagnoses. 
 
Needs-led services 
The largest group of services was categorised as needs-led; services are outlined in Table 3.  
Criteria for these services often highlighted their mental health focus, but without using specific 
diagnoses; for example, “patients who present with significant disability due to mental illness” 
(assertive outreach service, Trust D), or have difficulties “only in the context of a serious mental 
disorder” (psychiatric intensive care unit, PICU, Trust A). IAPT services were typically described as 
“for those individuals experiencing mild to moderate anxiety and depression” (Trust O), who 
“experience mild or moderate social and/or functional impairment” (Trust F). IAPT services 
frequently listed examples of specific diagnoses that fall within anxiety and depression-related 
difficulties, and one highlighted a “categorical (diagnostic) model” (Trust F); however, the remit of 
“mild to moderate” difficulties was central to all IAPT services’ eligibility criteria, thus their 
inclusion in the needs-led services. Similarly, some CMHTs gave examples of diagnoses, but as with 
the specialist services these were used to indicate a particular level of severity or need, which was also 
indicated by additional qualifiers: CMHTs outlined qualifiers such as: “Individuals accessing 
secondary care services are most likely to be: Services users with severe and persistent mental illness, 
such as schizophrenia, severe depression or bipolar disorder” (Trust I); “Psychotic disorders that 
cannot be managed within primary care services due to severity or because of complex and enduring 
need…Severe types of obsessive/compulsive disorder, phobia, anxiety disorders that significantly 
impair social functioning” (Trust P). 
 
 
The level of support required was also used to override diagnostic inclusion criteria, for example, 
although typically accepted diagnoses might be schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, two CMHTs stated 
that they would also accept “Any disorder where there is significant risk of self-harm or harm to 
others (e.g. acute depression, anorexia, high levels of anxiety) where the level of support exceeds that 
which the primary care team can offer” (Trust I and Trust M). 
The majority of criteria for CMHTs were non-diagnostic. As well as geographical criteria, these 
focused on the level of input services could provide: “People who have substantial and complex 
mental health needs which cannot be met by primary care, the IAPT Service or other community 
services” (Trust A and Trust K), or that require a “skilled or intensive treatment, multi-agency 
approach” (Trust F). Frequent non-diagnostic factors were: risk (“Complex presentations with a 
significant risk of self-harm, harm to others, risk of harm from others or serious self-neglect”, Trust 
A), or impaired functioning and other disability (“Suffer substantial disability as a result of their 
illness, such as an inability to care for themselves independently, sustain relationships or 
employment”, Trust D). Two trusts (Trust N and Trust P) divided their CMHTs into two pathways, 
“psychosis” and “non-psychosis”, akin to the wide-ranging diagnostic, or quasi-diagnostic, use of 
“common mental disorder” in IAPT. This distinction between the two intervention pathways reflected 
the different needs of the two groups. The psychosis pathway (Trust P), for example, emphasised 
“proactive interventions” to help with “poor treatment adherence”. 
Other services emphasised the level of care needed by individuals; “…assessment will always be 
based on clinical need. Patients will only be admitted if they display a level of risk aggression [sic] 
that presents as risk to self, others and property” (PICU, Trust H). Home treatment teams are 
designed as a last port of call of intensive intervention, aimed at avoiding inpatient admission. Criteria 
reflected this high level of care; “Crisis likely to necessitate psychiatric inpatient admission; Imminent 
risk of harm to self or others by a service user experiencing mental health problems; Early 
intervention is required to prevent relapse…” (Trust J). 
One Trust noted, “Decisions on whether someone should be accepted for services are based on their 
health and social care needs as a whole and not on Diagnosis alone” (CMHT, Trust I), and this 
balance between assessing the experiences of an individual alongside their needs and what a given 
service could provide was a common thread throughout the needs-led service criteria. These services 
acknowledged different levels of support; however, they do not formally recognise other needs that 




needs, home, family and social support, and specific interventions such as trauma therapy. Services 
supporting specific life circumstances Four services had pragmatic, needs-led, criteria that worked 
with individuals experiencing particular life circumstances; two military veterans services, a homeless 
and traveller team, and a perinatal mental health service (Table 4). The veterans’ services, for 
example, described a clear need for flexible provisions for a group that may not always be best served 
by traditional mental health services; “The whole ethos of the service is to be more responsive and 
accessible to this hard to reach cohort” (Trust P). Similarly, the homeless and traveller service (Trust 
K) made adaptations to meet the needs of an itinerant or insecurely housed population, and offered 
support to; “Homeless families in temporary accommodation and refuges; Young people (16–19 




It was notable, however, that psychiatric diagnoses tended to be used as exclusion, not inclusion, 
criteria. The most commonly cited diagnoses in exclusion criteria were drug or alcohol misuse and 
dependency, organic or degenerative conditions, such as dementia, and LD or autistic spectrum 
diagnoses, followed by “severe and enduring mental illness”, with examples given of personality 
disorder, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder diagnoses.  
The use of diagnoses as exclusion criteria implied their use as proxies for exclusion on the basis of a 
person’s needs being (a) too low; (b) too high; and (c) the service being inappropriate. Exclusion on 
the basis of low need was sometimes described by higher support services, for example, mild to 
moderate difficulties would not usually be seen in a CMHT. However, as mentioned earlier, these 
decisions can be overruled by clinical need, for example, within the exclusion criteria for a specialist 
psychological therapies service, “People who have mild to moderate mental health needs unless other 
interventions and treatments have failed…People whose assessed needs are classed as moderate to 
low unless specialist intervention is necessary to prevent an imminent risk of deterioration” (Trust I). 
Exclusion on the basis of high need was frequently noted in lower level services, particularly within 
primary care. For example, “Severe and enduring mental illness or in need of complex care package” 
(Trust N, Primary care), which is listed within the context of other exclusions such as high risk. As a 
consequence, frequently excluded diagnoses may be more vulnerable to being “gamed”. Clinicians 
may be reluctant to make a diagnosis such as “personality disorder” because it would then prevent 
their client from accessing a particular service, or, conversely, diagnosis may be (inappropriately) 
used as a means of refusing unwanted referrals, for instance in the case of oversubscribed or under-
resourced services. 
Where excluded diagnoses indicated that a service is inappropriate for particular difficulties, these 
tended to be alcohol or substance misuse or dependency, organic problems or learning disabilities. 
These labels indicated a need for particular intervention or skills that are available in specialist 
services. Nevertheless, these terms, although suggestive of diagnoses, are so broad as to be 
descriptive.  
Some Trusts’ responses were more explicit about why particular diagnoses were excluded. These 
descriptions give an indication of what these diagnoses represent, such as specific difficulties or levels 
of need that cannot be appropriately managed within these particular services. For example: “clear 
evidence of diagnosable antisocial personality disorder which infers significant risk” (Trust N, EIP) 
and “…repeat suicide attempts, deliberate self-harm, other impulsive self-injurious behaviours likely 
to indicate personality problems requiring interventions around emotion regulation” (Trust H, IAPT). 
The same service stated: Individuals with a current diagnosis of a personality disorder or PD traits 
which prevents them from engaging effectively in short term therapy e.g. patients for whom low 
mood or anxiety is a co-morbid feature of a personality disorder which require intervention in 
themselves. (Trust H, IAPT).  
Non-diagnostic exclusion criteria included descriptive information to the same effect; for example, 
exclusion criteria for one psychosexual service were based on difficulties outside of the remit of the 
support offered: We are not able to offer the service to patients whose sexual difficulties or behaviour 
have brought, or are at risk of bringing, them into conflict with the law; patients with advanced sexual 
or other addictions; patients who pose high risk of harm to self or others…. (Trust A). Such 
descriptions represent a more nuanced clinical rationale, applicable to inclusion and exclusion criteria, 
rather than black and white inclusion or exclusion based on diagnosis. These descriptions are also 
more appropriate given the now well-established NHS policy that personality disorder is no longer a 
diagnosis of exclusion (NIMHE, 2003), despite its frequent occurrence in Trusts’ exclusion 




Diagnoses are inefficient proxies for individuals’ needs, demonstrated by the requirement for 
extensive caveats and exceptions within service entry criteria. For each of the four service types 
identified, differences across service provision were driven more by professional competencies in 
specific teams than by diagnosis. Given the history of mental health services, diagnosis may be less a 
necessity for service entry criteria so much as a historical artefact. 
The use of broad pseudo-diagnostic categories (such as “severe and enduring mental illness”, or 
groups of diagnoses such as “personality disorders”) for important gatekeeping functions of service 
entry criteria reflect the common pragmatic or heuristic uses of diagnostic categories (Kendell & 
Jablensky, 2003). However, such categories are very different to the “rational, careful, respectful, 
diagnosis” (Callard et al., 2013, p. 2) advocated by diagnostic classification, and are at odds with the 
ICD and DSM models, new versions of which seek to increasingly define diagnoses in more precise 
ways (Kupfer, First, & Regier, 2002). Formal diagnostic classification places emphasis on specificity 
and detail, especially where commentators wish to draw distinctions between “normal” and 
“disordered” (Frances, 2014). However, in practice, mental health services and legal systems use 
much broader, more flexible definitions. The use of broad pseudodiagnostic categories (such as 
“severe and enduring mental illness”, “personality disorders” or “eating disorders”) may reflect 
pragmatic decisions within broadly medical mental health services, but represent significant 
conceptual divergence from the formal diagnostic manuals. 
The 2007 amendments to the Mental Health Act (MHA), for example, defined “mental disorder” as 
“any disorder or disability of the mind; and ‘mentally disordered’ shall be construed accordingly…” 
(Mental Health Act, 2007, p. 1). The MHA, therefore, does not require a specific psychiatric 
diagnosis to be decided upon by an assessing clinician prior to admission. These references to “mental 
disorder” hint towards but do not require the use of diagnoses, and are far from the precise application 
recommended by the ICD or DSM. The MHA and the Equality Act (2010) can be utilised by 
clinicians to work in the best interest of their clients, without using specific diagnostic labels. There 
are certain special circumstances related to substance misuse and intellectual disability; ensuring that 
these diagnoses alone cannot serve as sufficient criteria for detention, again requiring qualifying 
behavioural criteria such as “abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”. This again 
highlights the role of diagnoses as exclusion rather than inclusion criteria. 
To adopt innovative practices, including non-diagnostic approaches to service delivery, it is necessary 
to dispel myths; including the myth that ICD and DSM diagnoses are necessary for service planning 
and delivery. Alternatives to diagnostic approaches are already embedded within some NHS mental 
health services. Furthermore, specific psychological difficulties, such as depressed mood, voice-
hearing and non-suicidal self-injury, are now contained within the new ICD-11 (World Health 
Organization, 2018), which may represent a way forward for capturing data on phenomenological but 
non-diagnostic difficulties on which to organise services and to be reflected within staff competencies 
(Kinderman & Allsopp, 2018). Heterogeneity across services can encourage innovation, through 
which Trusts can learn from each other. This flexibility can be capitalised upon in order to better meet 
clients’ needs and more accurately identify client populations. Services could also work to better 
support other life factors, such as social, financial and trauma-related difficulties; these types of 
support appeared lacking within the services analysed. These needs are concurrent with mental 
distress but not captured within psychiatric diagnostic criteria. Both the ICD-10 and ICD-11 list over 
80 individual codes (such as homelessness, poverty, discrimination and negative life events in 
childhood, including trauma; codes Z55-Z65), which provide an existing means for mental health 
services to formally capture information about the psychosocial context of mental health difficulties 
(Allsopp & Kinderman, 2017). Together with the phenomenological codes, these developments in the 
ICD could improve clinical practice by facilitating the development of care pathways that target 
particular trajectories of distress following specific adversities (Kinderman & Allsopp, 2018). 
These findings have important clinical implications for psychiatrists; supporting approaches to 
developing innovative services that work with specific symptoms, life circumstances or demographic 
groups, rather than diagnoses. These implications are especially important for early intervention 
services and care pathways for secondary or targeted prevention of mental health difficulties 
(Costello, 2016), for individuals who are presenting with symptoms or a clear risk factor, such as the 
psychosocial factors identified above, but who would not yet meet the full criteria for a psychiatric 
diagnosis. Such pathways must necessarily be nondiagnostic in order to intervene to halt progression 
of distress into psychiatric disorders for the simple reason that diagnosis cannot, logically, follow 
successful prevention (McGorry, Ratheesh, & O’Donoghue, 2018). It is also worth noting that many 
diagnoses, especially for more serious problems, require prolonged periods of identifiable difficulties 
(in some cases as long as six months), which are incompatible with referral timelines, particularly for 
early intervention. As well as in the field of psychosis (McGorry, 2015), early intervention is also 
gaining momentum in the treatment of bipolar (Vieta et al., 2018) and in child and adolescent mental 
health services (Malla et al., 2016). 
 
Limitations 
These data cannot identify whether or not more diagnostic services better meet clients’ needs, but it is 
evident that diagnosis does not play an essential role in differentiating between services. The sample 
represents approximately 29% of NHS Mental Health Trusts in England, therefore may not be 
representative of all Trusts. In addition, some NHS Trusts declined to respond, some only gave brief 
overview of services, and therefore some data may have been incomplete. 
 
Future research 
In light of these limitations, future research exploring these implications could usefully subject the 
alternatives, including diagnosis-led approaches, to empirical tests, in order to compare whether 
individuals would have better access to services and receive better care if services use diagnostic 
versus non-diagnostic entry criteria. From a clinical service perspective, research should aim to 
establish in which context, for which type of problems, non-diagnostic versus diagnostic models 
would be best, as well as further exploring whether the use of broad descriptive categories are more 
effective, flexible ways of signposting appropriate services than specific diagnoses. Research could 
also evaluate innovative ways of supporting individuals with multiple needs, to avoid unnecessary 
exclusion from services due to particular diagnoses such as personality disorder. 
Wider functions of psychiatric diagnosis should be acknowledged, and for non-diagnostic approaches 
to extend across the field of mental health, further development will be required. For example, 
pharmaceutical companies are required to develop drugs on the basis of specific indications, currently 
diagnoses, and specific, non-diagnostic descriptions such as low mood may not suffice. The 
psychiatric pharmaceutical industry, however, is one already in flux, in part due to the difficulty of 
using heterogeneous diagnostic categories that lack biomarkers (Hyman, 2013). 
Furthermore, in practice, clinicians at times use psychiatric drugs “off label” for non-identified 
diagnoses, and tend to rely on clients’ specific symptom presentations rather than diagnostic labels. In 
fact, it has been argued that psychiatric classification “has little or no relevance to psychotropic drug 
action and as a consequence an accurate diagnosis is not required for optimal prescribing” (Taylor, 
2016, p. 224).  
Higher level, systems use of psychiatric diagnosis also requires careful thought, such as the use of 
diagnostic categories for healthcare providers remuneration, at both the level of individual insurance 
claims and of national health services. In the UK, for example, NHS Payment by Results (PbR) 
processes use “care clusters” (NHS England/NHS Improvement, 2019), such as “common mental 
health problems (low severity)” and “Non-psychotic chaotic and challenging disorders”, which, 
consistent with the findings of this paper, utilise broad descriptors of distress, severity and need, 
alongside pseudo-diagnostic distinctions including “psychotic”, “non-psychotic” and “cognitive 
impairment”. 
Finally, there will be other legal or regulatory barriers across which implementation questions must be 
negotiated, such as the MHA, and other laws that invoke psychiatric diagnoses. 
 
Disclosure statement 
Professor Kinderman is employed by the University of Liverpool and has received funding from a 
number of research charities and Councils. 
Funding 
Dr Allsopp reports grants from University of Liverpool as part of a PhD scholarship during the 
conduct of the study. 
 
ORCID 
Kate Allsopp http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5093-0404 




Allsopp, K., & Kinderman, P. (2017). A proposal to introduce formal recording of psychosocial 
adversities associated with mental health using ICD-10 codes. The Lancet Psychiatry, 4(9), 664–665. 
doi:10. 1016/S2215-0366(17)30318-8 
 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 3(2), 77–101. doi:10.1191/1478088706qp063oa 
 
Callard, F., Bracken, P., David, A. S., & Sartorius, N. (2013). Has psychiatric diagnosis labelled 
rather than enabled patients? BMJ, 347(1), f4312–f4313. doi:10.1136/bmj.f4312 
 
Costello, E. J. (2016). Early detection and prevention of mental health problems: Developmental 
epidemiology and systems of support. Journal of Clinical Child & Adolescent Psychology, 45(6), 
710–717. doi:10.1080/15374416.2016.1236728 
 
Craddock, N., & Mynors-Wallis, L. (2014). Psychiatric diagnosis: Impersonal, imperfect and 
important. British Journal of Psychiatry, 204(2), 93–95. doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.113.133090 
 
Equality Act. (2010). Equality Act. London: The Stationery Office. 
 
Frances, A. (2014). ICD, DSM and The Tower of Babel. Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Psychiatry, 48(4), 371–373. doi:10.1177/0004867414526792 
 
Harper, D. J. (2013). On the persistence of psychiatric diagnosis: Moving beyond a zombie 
classification system. Feminism & Psychology, 23(1), 78–85. doi:10.1177/0959353512467970 
 
Hyman, S. E. (2013). Psychiatric drug development: Diagnosing a crisis. Cerebrum : The Dana 
Forum on Brain Science, 2013(April), 5.  
 
Kendell, R., & Jablensky, A. (2003). Distinguishing between the validity and utility of psychiatric 
diagnoses. American Journal of Psychiatry, 160(1), 4–12. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.160.1.4 
 
Kinderman, P., & Allsopp, K. (2018). Non-diagnostic recording of mental health difficulties in ICD-
11. The Lancet Psychiatry, 5(12), 966. doi:10.1016/S2215-0366(18)30394-8 
 
Kupfer, D., First, M., & Regier, D. (2002). A research agenda for DSM V. Arlington, Virginia: 
American Psychiatric Association. 
 
Malla, A., Iyer, S., McGorry, P., Cannon, M., Coughlan, H., Singh, S., … Joober, R. (2016). From 
early intervention in psychosis to youth mental health reform: A review of the evolution and 
transformation of mental health services for young people. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric 
Epidemiology, 51(3), 319–326. doi:10.1007/s00127-015-1165-4 
 
McGorry, P. D. (2015). Early intervention in psychosis: Obvious, effective, overdue. The Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease, 203(5), 310–318. doi:10.1097/NMD.0000000000000284 
 
McGorry, P. D., Ratheesh, A., & O’Donoghue, B. (2018). Early intervention— An implementation 
challenge for 21st century mental health care. JAMA Psychiatry, 75(6), 545–546. 
doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2018.0621 
 
Mental Health Act. (2007). Mental Health Act, ch. 12. Retrieved from 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/12/pdfs/ukpga_20070012_en.pdf 
 
NHS England/NHS Improvement. (2019). 2019/20 National Tariff Payment System – A consultation 




NIMHE. (2003). Personality disorder: No longer a diagnosis of exclusion. London: National Institute 
for Mental Health.  
 
Savage, A., & Hyde, R. (2014). Using freedom of information requests to facilitate research. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 17(3), 303–317. doi:10.1080/13645579.2012. 
742280 
 
Taylor, D. (2016). Prescribing according to diagnosis: How psychiatry is different. World Psychiatry, 
15(3), 224–222. doi:10.1002/wps.20343 
 
Vieta, E., Salagre, E., Grande, I., Carvalho, A. F., Fernandes, B. S., Berk, M., … Suppes, T. (2018). 
Early intervention in bipolar disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 175(5), 411–426. doi:10.1176/ 
appi.ajp.2017.17090972 
 
Wanless, G. (2014). Freedom of information requests: Handling procedure. Newcastle Upon Tyne: 
NHS Business Services Authority.  
 
World Health Organization. (2018). International statistical classification of diseases and related 
health problems (11th Revision). Retrieved from https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en 
 
